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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents find no substantial fault with appellant's 
Statement of Facts, but it is felt there should be some 
clarification, and some emphasis on further facts in this 
case. 
Respondents, the Blackers from Utah and the Blackers 
from Idaho, two separate and distinct entities, had been 
in the furniture and appliance business for many years. 
We shall hereafter refer to both entities as "The Blackers". 
Third party defendants, John Gray and Edward Graven, 
hereafter referred to as "Gray" and "Graven", were dis-
missed from the lawsuit herein on October 29, 1984, by 
reason of the bankruptcies filed by them (R-122-123). 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Copper State Leasing Company, 
hereafter referred to as "Copper State", had been contacted 
by Gray and Graven on several occasions and had explained 
to them in detail the program referred to as an arbitrage 
system (the buying and selling very quickly of commodities, 
and profiting through the fluctuation in prices and 
through the use of computers). The purpose of the meetings 
with Copper State by Gray and Graven was not only to have 
them understand every step of the arbitrage program, but 
to have them become the leasing entity of computers with 
their numerous investors who would be leasing the computers 
CTT-7-9, 41-42, Gray Depo. 4-5). 
Although other leasing companies were checked on by 
Gray and Graven, they seemed to settle upon and deal with 
Copper State as they had done business numerous times with 
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Copper State and they had a verbal agreement with them, that 
if people qualified, the lease would be consummated 
(TT-10-11). 
Gray and Graven anticipated making profits from the 
sale of computers to Copper State, who would own title to 
the equipment and in turn lease it to the investors found 
by Gray and Graven (TT-15). 
Gray and Graven operated through the use of certain 
organi2:ations, to-wit: "Funds Management Systems", 
"Unified Mortgage", and "Cowboy Computer", but according 
to two employees of Gray and Graven, those organizations 
were one and the same as Gray and Graven and were being 
used and manipulated to suit their own specific purposes, 
(See Janice Cash and D.R. Anderson Affidavits R-30-35) 
The Blackers were contacted by Gray and Graven in the 
spring of 1981 about the arbitrage program, after the 
contact and explanation of the system had been made to 
Copper State (TT-7-8). The Blackers were told that a 
master computer had been lined up (Gary Blacker Depo. 21), 
but that each of the investors (about 35 being involved) 
would need their own computers to be in the program and 
that Copper State was involved in the program. (James 
Blacker Depo. 7, 11, 12, 13, 17, 19, James Blacker 
Affidavit R-36-38). (See also TT 124-125 for Copper 
State's involvement). 
The Blackers were further informed by Gray and 
Graven that the Blackers would be required to sign as 
lessees of the two computers (one for each Blacker entity), 
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but that in fact Gray and Graven would be making the lease 
payments as a part of the arbitrage program and that 
Copper State understood this arrangement (Cash and Blacker 
Affidavits R-30-32, R-36-38, Gary Blacker Depo. 23-24, 
James Blacker Depo, 19-20, 36-38). 
It was not until approximately 6 months after the 
leases were executed by Slackers that Copper State informed 
Blackers that Gray and Graven were not paying the lease 
payments, although Gray had sent in one or two checks as 
payments that had not cleared. (Gary Blacker Depo. 48-49, 
James Blacker Depo. 42) 
There was virtually no contact between Copper State 
and Blackers. All matters were conducted through Gray 
and Graven, including lease arrangements, getting the 
Blacker stores cleared and accepted by Copper State 
after first being rejected, obtaining signatures, the 
information to be put on the leases, obtaining the money 
for the purchase of the computers, what was placed on the 
invoices describing the computers to come from Data General, 
the 90-day delay period on delivery, etc. (Cash, Anderson, 
and Blacker Affidavits, R-30-38, James Blacker Depo. 9, 
19T20, 37-38, 51-52, TT-63, 108-109, Gary Blacker Depo. 
24, 27-28). 
Copper State, however, did have one of their 
representatives present, along with Gray and Graven, when 
the pictures were shown of a type computer from Data 
General and the 90-day delay time from Data General was 
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talked about. (Gary Blacker Depo. 30-31, 36-37, James Blacker 
Depo. 27, TT-63). 
Copper State, furthermore was aware that the money they 
paid over to Gray and Graven, made out to Cowboy Computer, 
was for the purpose of Gray and Graven to obtain the 
computers from Data General, and that Cowboy Computer 
was not the actual supplier, even thoucrh the name of the 
supplier of the computers was left off the leases. (TT-
137-138, Cash and Anderson Affidavits R-30-35). 
At the time Copper State turned over the $84,000.00 
to Gray and Graven, Blackers were unaware that Gray and 
Graven diverted the money into a diamond scheme with 
Mr. Vasilocopolous to try and make a fast return, or that 
Gray and Graven had not perfected the order from 
Data General on the computers, and these facts were not 
discovered by Blackers until several months later, in 
fact after Mr. Vasilocopolous had been arrested. (James 
Blacker Depo. 46, TT-40, 42, 52, TT-119). 
Gray stated that he couldnft remember if he told 
Copper State of the interim investment in diamonds, of 
their funds, but that Copper State knew that the computer 
equipment was not there (with Gray and Graven and 
Cowboy Computer), and that it would be sometime before 
the computer equipment would be there (TT-30, 32, TT-120). 
Blackers invested $300,000.00 from both stores in the 
arbitrage program with Gray and Graven, and because of the 
delays involved with arbitrage, they authorized their 
$30.0,000 to go into the interim diamond investment which 
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was lost. However, the Blackers at no time authorized, 
or knew of, the Copper State money to go into the said 
interim investment, but Blackers understood that between 
Copper State and Gray and Graven computers would in fact 
be provided to them. (Gary Blacker Depo. 40-46, 58-59, 
James Blacker Depo. 26-27, 42-43, TT-40, 42-43, 52-53 91, 
93-94, TT 119-121). 
Further, at the time Blackers discovered that 
Gray and Graven had used Copper State's money in the 
diamond investment, Blackers asked whether Copper State 
was aware of this fact, and Gray and Graven responded 
that they were. Thus, Blackers did not say anything to 
Copper State about it. (TT 119-120) 
The Copper State leases were signed by the Blackers 
but no computers were ever ultimately ordered, delivered, 
or received by Blackers and no effort was made by Copper 
State to see that the computers were obtained or delivered. 
(James Blacker Depo. 21, James Blacker Affidavit R-36-38, 
Steven Beckstead Depo. 11) 
Furthermore, Blackers were led to believe by Copper 
State and Gray and Graven at the time Graven instructed 
Blackers to type the words in their leases, "Disburse 
money to Cowboy Computer prior to delivery of computer. 
We understand that this will initiate the lease . . .", 
that the ordering of the computers had in fact been 
perfected through Data General, that the money was needed 
to pay the supplier, Data General, so that Copper State 
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could get title to the equipment and that delivery of the 
same was in process but would take three months or so. 
(James Blocker Depo. 26-27f 30-32, Gary Blacker Depo. 
36-37, 63, 69-70, TT-48-49, 93, 102, 114, 135-137). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. There were no material factual issues involved 
or in dispute at the hearing of September 4, 1984, when 
both appellant and respondents1 attorneys argued their 
cross motions for Summary Judgment- There was nothing 
apparent to the lower court as to any disputed material 
issues. Both attorneys represented to the court that there 
were no factual disputes, and no objections or opposition 
was raised by any party to the facts that had been care-
fully submitted and argued before the court. Nothing 
could be further developed from a factual standpoint by 
another trial, as wide latitude was given in interrogating 
all the essential witnesses in the Second Cause of Action, 
and the lower court was justified in granting Summary 
Judgment in Respondents1 favor. 
Furthermore, the lower court was correct in holding, 
as a matter of law, that Copper State was not entitled to 
recover from Blackers lease payments for computers under 
the Lease agreements signed by Blackers as Blackers never 
received the computer equipment and Copper State never 
obtained title, by reason of the wrongful diversion of 
Copper State's funds by intermediaries, Gray and Graven. 
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2. Copper State worked closely with Gray and Graven 
with the anticipation of becoming the leasing entity for 
numerous investors found by Gray and Graven. Gray and 
Graven anticipated on making profits through the sale of 
computers to Copper State. Thus an agency developed between 
them in the acquisition of computers. Gray and Graven 
misused Copper State's money that should have crone to buy 
the computer equipment. Blackers had no knowledge of 
Gray and Gravensf actions and did not and could not clothe 
them with any apparent authority to do anything wrongful 
or unauthorized. 
3. Blackers did not discover the wrongful diversion 
of Copper State's money by Gray and Graven in the 
Vasilocopolous Diamond Scheme until several months after 
the occurrance and that was also after the publicity and 
arrest of Vasilocopolous had taken place. There could be 
no ratification of Gray and Gravens1 unauthorized actions 
by Blackers under these circumstances. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN RESPONDENTS" FAVOR ON COPPER 
STATE'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. 
A. Counsel for appellant argues that the lower court 
was in error in granting a Partial Summary Judgment in favor 
of Blackers by reason of numerous genuine issues of material 
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fact being involved or in dispute at the hearing. We do not 
agree. 
There were no material factual issues involved or 
disputed at the hearing on September 4, 1984 when both 
Copper State's and Blackers' (plaintiff and defendants) 
Motions for Summary Judgment were argued before the Court. 
In fact both parties' attorneys, in filing their seperate 
Motions for Summary Judgment, as well as in the actual 
argument before the Court, represented that there were no 
factual disputes and no genuine issues of material facts 
to be determined by the Court. 
It should be noted that Copper State's attorney from 
the commencement of the case and through all of the 
Summary Judgment motions and hearings was Richard Crandall 
of Snow, Christensen and Martineau. After the lower court's 
decision in Slackers' favor on the Summary Judgment motions, 
Attorney Richard Crandall withdrew from the case and 
Attorney Jeffrey M. Jones of Allen, Nelson, Hardy and 
Evans entered his appearance to handle the trial in the 
Second Cause of Action and this appeal. 
0>n February 18, 1983, Attorney Crandall filed 
motions for Summary Judgment (R-22-25) on behalf of Copper 
State. This was opposed by Blackers, (R-40-43) and after 
a hearing on the matter the court denied Copper State's 
Motions (R-51). Thereafter, Copper State amended their 
Complaint, alleging two causes of action against Blackers. 
After some further discovery procedures it was agreed 
between counsel for the parties and the Court that in order 
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to save possible trial time, Copper State would submit to 
Blackers, through counsel, their issues of facts, 
memorandum and authorities on the law, and then Blackers 
would respond in like manner. 
On March 26, 1984, Attorney Crandall hand delivered 
Copper State's Facts and Memorandum to counsel for 
Blackers, along with his Motion for entry of Judgment in 
Copper State's favor, "on the grounds and for the reason 
that there is no issue of material fact, the existence of 
which would constitute a defense to the plaintiff's claims.If 
On March 30, 1984, counsel for Blackers objected to 
Copper State's Motion, at that time, on the basis that it 
was premature, and that in accordance with the under-
standing of counsel and the court, Blackers needed some 
time to respond to Copper State's memorandum with their 
own memorandum (R-82-84). 
Thereafter, on July 5, 1984, counsel for Blackers 
filed his "Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion 
for Entry of Judgment and Memorandum in Support of 
Blackers Motion for Summary Judgment." (R 96) 
In Blackers Motion for Summary Judgment (R-94), counsel 
set forth, just as Copper State's attorney had done, 
"that there are no genuine issues as to any material 
facts . . . " 
Argument on the two notions was set for September 4, 
1984. The court gave the parties considerable time for 
the argument, and the same was transcribed by the Court 
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Reporter (see Transcript of Proceedings of September 4, 
1984 1-32). In that argument counsel for both parties 
spent considerable time setting forth the material facts 
in the case and there was no dispute on those facts for 
either side, and the Court made the comment: 
'"Countermotion for Summary Judgment, I take an 
admission by both sides if there are no material 
issues of fact, so whatever I do will be dis-
positive of this case, I suppose, Richard, 
anything further?" 
No further comment was made by the attorneys, 
and so the Court, after taking the matter under advise-
ment and study, later made its decision in Blackers 
favor. However, upon motion for clarification it was 
determined that Copper State's Second Cause of Action 
was not disposed of by the Court's ruling and thus a 
trial was had on those issues. 
Counsel for Blackers had set forth a statement of 
facts in his memorandum supporting Summary Judgment in 
Blackers favor (R-96-102), and in that statement there 
was noted in great detail for each set of facts the 
references to the depositions, affidavits, and 
documents involved in the case. At no time did counsel 
for Copper State raise any question/ opposition or dispute 
as to those facts, even though there was an entire month 
that passed between the filing of the memorandum and 
the argument on the motions. Indeed, there was in fact 
no dispute as to any of the material facts. 
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Counsel for appellant cites several Utah cases in his 
argument on the "Standard for Summary Judgment on Review", 
but we see no conflict with those cases on what the lower 
court ruled in our case. Furthermore, none of those cases 
cited involved cross or mutual motions for Summary Judgment. 
The case Mastic Tile Division of Ruberoid Co. v. 
Acme Distributing Co., 389 P 2d 56 (Utah 1964) is a case 
where both sides presented mutual motions for Summary 
Judgment, and the Court held that the losing party was 
not entitled to a trial on the facts after the Court made 
its decision. The holding is as follows: 
"Where both sides laid controversy in lap of 
court by Summary Judgment motions and inter-
pretation of writing was only issue, court 
could not be required to submit to subsequent 
urging of loser that although he took his 
chances without reservation, he should have 
another go at case at trial." 
In the case at bar, the only issue in the First Cause 
of Action was the interpretation of the lease documents signed 
by the Blackers involving two computers that were never 
received, and the controversy was laid in the lap of the 
lower court. Copper State should not now be allowed to 
change legal counsel and have another go at the case at 
another trial, and especially since Copper State was allowed 
great latitude by the lower court in developing its case 
on the Second Cause of Action, touching upon the entire 
case and interrogating essentially all of the witnesses 
who were involved in the controversy. In other words, 
nothing could be further developed or gained, from a 
factual standpoint, from another trial of this case 
that is not already in the record. 
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The case of Dupler v. Yates, 351 P2d 624 (Utah 1960) 
also holds for the proposition that: 
"Where defendants produced evidence that pierced 
the allegations of the Complaint and the plaintiff 
did not controvert, explain, or destroy that 
evidence by counter affidavit or otherwise, the 
court would be justified in concluding that no 
genuine issue of fact was present and that Summary 
Judgment should be rendered for the moving party." 
See also along these lines the case of Continental 
Bank and Trust Company v. Cunningham, 353 P 2nd 16 8 (Utah 
1960) . 
Furthermore, Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure implies that a party opposing Summary Judgment 
needs to show forth some defense of his position or he can't 
complain. In the last half of the rule it states: 
" . . . when a motion for Summary Judgment is made 
and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleadings, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, Summary Judgment, if appropriate, shall 
be entered against him." 
In Burningham v. Ott 525 P 2nd 620 (Utah 1974) the 
court held: 
"Plaintiff says the case should be decided under the 
rules that (1) the evidence should be viewed in a 
light favorable to the plaintiff, and (2) a Summary 
Judgment is a harsh rule. He is not correct in 
either claim. In Summary Judgments, evidence is not 
to be viewed. The judgment can be given only in case 
there is no dispute on a material evidentiary matter. 
We do not see that it is a harsh rule to tell a 
party that he is not entitled to recover as a matter 
of law when the facts are not in dispute." 
Again in Webster v. Sill 675 P 2nd 1170 (Utah 1983) 
this court said: 
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"To raise a genuine issue of fact to preclude Summary 
Judgment, an affidavit must do more than reflect 
affiants opinions and conclusions, affiant must set 
forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue 
for trial." 
In the annotation on cross motions for Summary Judgment 
36 ALR 2nd 835, under the issue of "effect of motions as 
admissions", it states: 
"on cross motions for Summary Judgment, each party 
admits for the purpose of his motion that there is 
no issue of material fact and that the facts alleged 
by the adverse party, properly pleaded, are true." 
When the present case was argued before the lower court 
on cross motions for Summary Judgment there were simply no 
material factual issues in dispute, and although present 
counsel for Copper State now says there were some disputes, 
the Judge was not obligated to go through all the material 
to see if he could find, by microscopic inspection, some-
thing that possibly could be questioned when the attorneys 
for both parties agreed that there were no disputed 
material factual issues. 
Counsel for Copper State sets forth about 8 situations 
comparing facts of Copper State and the Slackers to try and 
show material disputes between the parties. A close 
examination of these situations, however, discloses that 
there was in fact no real dispute, or if there was some 
question or difference, it was not really material and would 
not have a serious bearing on the questions of law before 
the court. Counsel also wrongfully cites the statements 
of witnesses from the trial transcript (TT) to show some 
differences, which facts were not developed until the trial 
of the Second Cause of Action, May 15, 1985, almost a year 
-11-
after the cross motions for Summary Judgment were presented. 
In any event, most all, if not all, the so called questions 
raised by counsel in his 8 situations were clarified in the 
trial that took place on May 15, 1985, and nothing could be 
further developed that's not already of record in this case 
from a factual standpoint, that could bear on the law 
issues. 
B. Counsel for appellant further argues that the 
lower court was in error in granting partial Summary Judgment 
in favor of Blackers as a matter of law. Again we do not 
agree. 
We have outlined the detailed facts in the "Statement 
of Facts" in this brief along with the details and refer-
ences to the record, but for purposes of this argument on 
the law certain pertinent facts are reviewed. 
1. Copper State Leasing Company was to purchase 
certain described computer equipment and hold title to the 
same. 
2. Copper State agreed to lease that computer 
equipment to the two Blacker entities for certain rental 
fees. 
3. John Gray and Edward Graven acted as inter-
mediaries between lessor and lessees, there being little or 
no contact between Copper State and Blackers. 
4. Gray and Graven had represented to Blackers that 
they would be making the lease payments on the computers 
and they in fact made attempts at one or two payments with 
plaintiff. 
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5. Gray and Graven had considerable contact with 
Copper State and it was known that many investors could be 
involved with leasing computers through plaintiff company. 
6. Blackers were turned down oriqinally on their 
lease applications by Copper State, but were later approved 
through no effort of their own, but through the efforts or 
intervention of Gray and Graven. 
7. Copper State had Gray and Graven instruct 
Blackers exactly what to type on the lease agreements just 
prior to disbursing approximately 584,000.00 ($42,000.00 
for each lease) to Gray and Graven (Cowboy Computer). 
8. No purchase of computer equipment from the real 
supplier, Data General, was in fact made. 
9. No computer equipment was ever received by nor 
delivered to either of the Blacker entities. 
10. Blackers did not know that Gray and Graven had 
diverted the funds received from Copper State to other 
uses. 
11. Blackers were not notified by Copper State 
until approximately six months after the signing of the 
leases, that Gray and Graven were not making lease 
payments. 
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, 
Respondents, Blackers, should not be required by law to 
pay rental and lease payments on computer equipment they 
have never received or had the use of. 
Under paragraph 5 of the lease agreement (Addendum 
2 and 5 - Appellant's Brief) it states: 
-15-
"Ordering Equipment, Lessee hereby requests Lessor 
to purchase the equipment from the above-named 
supplier . . . " 
No supplier was listed anywhere on the lease agree-
ments, but Copper State, and Gray and Graven had mentioned 
to Blackers, and shown them pictures, of the computers to 
come from Data General. 
Now, Blackers had a right to rely on the fact that 
if they were ultimately to have a responsibility in the 
payment of the lease, then lessor had the responsibility to 
see that it was in fact acquired (title obtained) and 
properly ordered. That responsibility was not altered by 
having lessees agree to a disbursement of funds prior to 
delivery. (It was understood there would be about a 
three month waiting period for delivery). 
We need to look to the intention of all the parties 
as we view this transaction and what transpired. 
In the first place, there appeared to be a close 
working relationship between Gray and Graven and Copper 
State by reason of the Arbitrage Program that had been 
explained to them step by step, and that Copper State 
contemplated becoming the leasing entity of computers 
with the numerous investors of Gray and Graven, and at 
least one (the Anderson) lease and computer had already 
taken place with Copper State through Gray and Graven. 
That computer had been shown to the Blackers. (See Gary 
Blacker Depo. p. 36-38). The 90 day delay in delivery 
time had also been discussed. Furthermore, it was clearly 
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understood between Blackers and Gray and Graven that Gray 
and Graven would see to the lease payments for the 
computers. (See Gray Depo. P. 9-10). 
Now, with this background, when Blackers were instruct-
ed by Gray and Graven to type on the leases, "Please dis-
burse money to Cowboy Computers prior to delivery. We 
understand that this will initiate the lease and payments 
will start one month from date of funding," it was the 
intention of the parties that the computer equipment would 
be ordered by lessor and that they were putting out the 
money up front for that purpose. That there would be a 
delay in actual delivery to the Blackers, but in the mean-
time any payments to Copper State Leasing would be coming 
from Gray and Graven. 
Therefore, when in fact NO computer equipment was 
ever shipped out and none ever received by Blackers, the 
lease agreements became null and void and Blackers could 
rescind. There was no consideration, no bargain fulfilled, 
and the lease agreements cannot be enforced against 
Blackers. 
The lease agreements themselves, Paragraph 8, also 
support this view (R-6), it states: 
"Upon the execution of this lease and the delivery of 
an item of equipment, lessee shall be obligated to 
perform in accordance with the terms hereof." 
Because no item of equipment was ever received, 
lessees should not be required to pay the rental. 
This argument of Blackers/ contrary to the argument 
of appellant, is also supported in the recent Utah Supreme 
Court cases of "FIIA Financial Corporation v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 
Utah, 617 P 2nd 327 (1980) and Nielsen and Walton v. MFT 
Leasing, Utah 656 P 2nd 454 (1982). Both of these cases 
are almost exactly the situation we have here with Copper 
State Leasing and the Blackers. 
In the FMA v. Hansen Dairy case, FMA brought action 
for damages on breach of a written lease agreement in the 
lease of a used corn silo. The defendants asserted the 
defense of failure of consideration in that the silo was 
not delivered and installed as agreed. The defendants had 
signed an acceptance notice which provided: 
"the items received by us were and are in good order 
and condition and acceptable to us as delivered or 
installed." 
With that acceptance notice signed, FMA then paid out 
$36,000.00. FMA argued that defendants should be estopped 
to claim failure of consideration because of the signed 
acceptance. The court, however did not agree and held in 
favor of defendants. 
Just as in the FMA case, there was failure of consid-
eration in the Blackers never having received the computer 
equipment, even though they had signed (so to speak) the 
"acceptance notice" involving delivery and the payout of the 
money - exactly as in the FMA case. 
Similarly, and even more like our present case, is the 
"Nielsen and Walton v. MFT Leasing" case above cited. In 
that case Nielsen and Walton sued MFT Leasing to rescind a 
lease of computer equipment for failure of consideration. 
MFT counter-claimed against Nielsen and Walton seeking a 
money judgment for the lease payments, (just as in our case). 
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The trial court granted a decree of rescission of the lease 
based on MFT's failure to provide the computer equipment 
called for in the lease, (just as in our case). The Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. 
The facts in the MFT case showed that there was an 
acknowledgment of delivery which stated: 
"that the lease equipment had been delivered to 
Nielsen and Walton and that Nielsen and Walton had 
examined the equipment invoice and requested MFT 
to pay the amount of the invoice to the supplier." 
The computer equipment, however, called for in the 
lease was not the same as the computer equipment delivered. 
(Our case is stronger in that no computer equipment was 
ever received by Blackers). 
The Supreme Court stated: 
"having proved that the equipment delivered was not 
the equipment specified in the lease, Nielsen's and 
Walton's acknowledgment of delivery does not 
necessarily defeat their claim of lack of consider-
ation, at least where MFT knew, or had an ample 
opportunity to determine, that the goods which were 
the subject matter of the lease had not been 
delivered. Under such circumstances, a written 
recital that consideration has ever been received 
may be contradicted." (The court cited the FMA v. 
Hansen Dairy case in further support of this holding). 
MFT argued that the trial court based its decision 
for rescinding the lease agreement on other grounds 
involving the supplier of the equipment, but the Supreme 
Court reiterated that; 
"The findings of fact and conclusions of law clearly 
show that the trial court based its decision on the 
fact that MFT did not provide the equipment specified 
in the lease contract." - - - "that these findings 
clearly support the trial court's conclusion of law 
that the plaintiffs were entitled to rescind the lease 
for failure of consideration." 
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Now counsel for appellant attempts to show that a 
new bargain was reached when the words, "Please disburse 
money to Cowboy Computers prior to delivery", were written 
on the leases and further that this is different, or 
distinguishes this case, from the "FMA" and "MFT" cases. 
This is not so. 
In the first place Copper State knew that Cowboy 
Computer (Gray and Graven) was not the supplier, but that 
Data General was the supplier (TT 137-138, Cash and 
Anderson Affidavits R-30-35, Gary Blacker Depo. 30-31, 
36-37, James Blacker Depo. 27, TT 63), and even though 
Blackers acknowledged that the money could be paid over, 
they still expected Copper State to receive title to the 
equipment. This was not done and no new bargain was reached. 
Exactly the same situation arose in the "MFT" and 
"FMA" cases. Nielsen and Walton, in the "MFT" case, had 
acknowledged delivery and requested MFT to pay the amount of 
the invoice. Isn't that exactly what was done here? rPlease 
disburse and we will take responsibility of delivery." We 
fail to see the distinction that appellant is trying to make 
in these two Utah cases, and we submit that these two 
cases do apply and are right in point in our situation. 
POINT II 
THE BLACKERS DID NOT CLOTHE GRAY AND GRAVEN WITH 
APPARENT AUTHORITY TO RENDER THE BLACKERS LIABLE 
FOR COPPER STATE'S LOSS OF LEASE PROCEEDS. 
This issue of "apparent authority" was not raised 
by appellant, Copper State, in its complaint either in the 
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First Cause of Action or the Second Cause of Action, and 
it should not now be argued by them on appeal. 
The lower court, however, did make a finding on 
June 4, 1985, after the trial on the Second Cause of Action, 
as follows; 
"4. That John Gray and/or Edward Graven and/or 
any of their entities were not the agents of 
defendants in connection with the use of the funds 
that were paid over to the said John Gray and Edward 
Graven from plaintiff that went into the investment 
scheme of the said John Gray, Edward Graven or their 
entities." (Addendum No. 10 - Appellant's Brief) 
There were ample facts, however, to show that Gray 
and Graven were agents on behalf of Copper State in 
connection with the acquisition of the computer equipment. 
Copper State had been contacted several times by 
Gray and Graven and had explained to them every step of the 
Arbitrage Program and in addition Copper State anticipated 
becoming the leasing entity of computers with Gray and 
Graven1s numerous investors (about 35 were mentioned). 
(TT-7-9, 41-42, Gray Depo. 4-5), 
Gray and Graven anticipated making profits from the 
sale of computers to Copper State, who would own title to 
the equipment and in turn lease to the investors found by 
Gray and Graven. (TT-15) 
Gray and Graven also had done business numerous 
times with Copper State and a verbal commitment was 
reached with them that if people qualified the lease 
would be consummated (TT-10-11). 
There was also very little contact between Copper 
State and Slackers. Essentially all matters were conducted 
through Gray and Graven, including lease arrangements, 
getting the Blackers cleared and accepted by Copper State 
even though being first rejected, obtaining signatures, 
outlining exactly what statements were to be written on the 
leases, obtaining the money for the purchase of the 
computers, the information that went on the invoices 
describing the computers to come from Data General, the 
information on the 90 day delay period on delivery, etc. 
(Cash, Anderson and Blacker Affidavits, R-30-38, James 
Blacker Depo. 9, 19-20, 37-38, 51-52, TT 63, 108-109, Gary 
Blacker Depo. 24, 27-28). 
It is apparent that all of these acts of Gray and 
Graven were for the benefit and profit of Copper State 
and Gray and Graven in these lease transactions and 
constituted an agency between them. 
Thus, the knowledge of Gray and Graven concerning 
the supplier and the ordering, (or failure to order) the 
computer equipment is imputed to Copper State leasing as 
the lessor. This is true, whether or not the lease agree-
ment states otherwise as to agency. 
Again the case in point on this issue is the Utah 
case (1980) of FMA Financial Corporation v. Hansen Dairy, 
Inc., previously cited herein. The court held: 
"that an agent's knowledge with respect to the 
lease agreement was imputed to the lessor where 
the lessor entrusted the handling of its interests 
in the lease transaction to the agent." 
It was also noted in the FMA case, that all dealings 
were done through the levies, the sellers of the equipment 
to the leasing company (comparable to Gray and Graven in 
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our case), and that levies received the $36,000,00 check 
for the equipment. The court held that because FMA (lessor) 
entrusted levies to the handling of the transaction that 
levies knowledge was imputed to FMA, and this was true even 
though the lease agreement may state otherwise. The court 
ignored the language in the lease as to agency, stating: 
"We so state in awareness of the language in the lease 
which provided: fLessee understands and agrees that 
neither supplier nor any salesman or other agent or 
supplier, is an agent of lessor - - - and no represent-
ation as to equipment or any other matter by supplier 
shall in any way affect lessees duty to pay the rent1 
_ _ _
 n 
. 
The situation in the FMA case is very similar to our 
case on this agency question, and it is Slackers' con-
tention that any knowledge of Gray and Graven in the 
obtaining of the computer equipment, or the failure to 
obtain the same, should be imputed to Copper State Leasing, 
and even though Copper State paid out their money to Gray 
and Graven (Cowboy Computer), and Blackers had signed the 
leases, nevertheless, Copper State should be denied their 
claim of rental or other damages on the lease agreements 
because of their failure to provide the computer equipment 
to Blackers. 
POINT III 
THE BLACKERS DID NOT RATIFY THE ACTIONS OF GRAY 
AND GRAVEN SUFFICIENT TO MAKE THEM LIABLE FOR 
COPPER STATEfS LOSS. 
The trial court found (in the Second Cause of Action) 
that Blackers had no knowledge at all of Gray and Graven's 
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diverting Copper State's money into the diamond investment 
scheme (Addendum No. 10 - Appellant's Brief). Furthermore, 
again, because of the close working relationship between 
Copper State and Gray and Graven, which had extended over 
the years, Copper State was no doubt in a better position 
to know the thinking of Gray and Graven than were the 
Blackers, and perhaps Copper State should have known that 
when they gave the lease proceeds to Gray and Graven that 
the money might be used for an unauthorized purpose. It 
is just as ludicrous to believe that Blackers knew or 
should have known that Gray and Graven would misuse the 
funds that were to purchase the computers as to believe 
that Copper State knew or should have known that would 
transpire. 
Blackers did make a $300,000.00 investment of their 
own funds with Gray and Graven, which amount was lost to 
them, but Blackers did not become aware of either the 
scheme involved with Vasilocopolous or that Copper State's 
money had gone there until several months later and after 
Mr. Vasilocopolous had been arrested (James Blacker Depo. 
46, TT-40, 42, 52, TT-119). 
Also, at the time Blackers discovered that Gray and 
Graven had used Copper State's money in the diamond invest-
ment, after the publicity and the arrest, it was too late 
to do anything about it. Nevertheless, Blackers did inquire 
of Gray and Graven at that time whether or not Copper State 
was aware of the use that had been made of their money and 
they responded in the affirmative. Thus, Blackers did not 
say anything to Copper State about it (TT-119-120). 
The cases cited by appellant on ratification require 
the principal to have knowledge of all material facts and 
an intent to ratify, Blackers had no knowledge of the facts 
and thus could not be in a position to ratify the unauthor-
ized use of Copper Statefs funds. Blackers had fully 
expected the Copper State money to be turned over to Data 
General - the supplier - for the purchase of the computers, 
and it would be ridiculous to believe that Blackers ratified 
any other use of those funds• 
Appellant further argues that the failure to dis-
affirm may constitute ratification, but this, too, is 
preposterous in this case as Blackers did not become aware 
of the diversion of Copper State's money until it was too 
late to do anything about it, and Blackers had every right 
to believe that Copper State had become aware of the matter 
or that Gray and Graven had in fact disclosed this to them. 
Copper State's attempt to shift their loss to 
Blackers by reason of ratification of the wrongful conduct 
of Gray and Graven should be struck down. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court properly granted Summary Judgment 
in respondent's favor on the First Cause of Action, and 
said court was also correct in entering Judgment in favor 
of respondents and against appellant of no cause of 
action on the Second Cause of Action. This court should 
therefore affirm the judgments and decisions of the lower 
court in this case. 
DATED this Ifr* day of January, 1986. 
Respectfully submitted, 
'#-> 
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